Commons Without Tragedy: Sampling Dynamics and Cooperative Resource Extraction
Universidad de Los Andes
Universidad de los Andes, Colombia - Department of Economics
Barnard College, Columbia University; Santa Fe Institute
August 1, 2013
This paper reconsiders evidence from experimental common pool resource games from the perspective of a dynamic model of sampling. Despite being parameter-free, the model is able to replicate some striking features of the data: monotonic frequency distributions, the persistent use of strictly dominated actions, and stable heterogeneity in choices. We argue that these patterns cannot be fully accounted for by existing theories based on other-regarding preferences and norms, and that the dynamics of sampling provide a useful complementary explanation for behavior in social dilemmas.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 29
Keywords: Common Pool Resources Experiments, Sampling Equilibrium
JEL Classification: C73, C91, D03, H41, Q20working papers series
Date posted: August 1, 2013
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