

Credit Rationing and Pass-Through in Supply Chains: Theory and Evidence from Bangladesh

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ABSTRACT

The standard model of pass-through in imperfectly competitive markets focuses on double marginalization of rents and highlights the importance of the curvature of demand curve. We develop a model of equilibrium prices in a supply chain with financing intermediaries to incorporate credit rationing faced by wholesale traders. The financing intermediaries help relax the quantitative credit limits faced by the wholesalers by reducing moral hazard through informal enforcement mechanisms not available to formal banks. To discriminate between models with and without credit rationing, we exploit a policy experiment in Bangladesh in 2011 which banned financing intermediaries called Delivery Order Traders (DOTs) from edible oils market. The elimination of DOTs from the market leads to higher pass-through rate and a lower intercept of the wholesale price equation in the standard double marginalization model. A model of financing intermediaries where DOTs provide low-interest credit, and the wholesalers do not face quantity constraints also yields the same conclusions. In contrast, a model with quantitative credit rationing yields sharply different predictions: the ban on DOTs raises the intercept and reduces the pass-through rate. The pass-through rate falls as the elimination of DOTs tightens the credit constraints faced by the wholesalers and the effective wholesale demand curve becomes a rectangular hyperbola with a lower (unit) elasticity. We test the predictions using a difference-in-difference design with wheat as the comparison commodity, and provide evidence on the credibility of the research design using a placebo reform date and a placebo treatment commodity (lentil). Contrary to the expectations of the policy-makers, prices were higher in post-reform period when world prices of crude oils were declining, because the ban resulted in lower pass-through rate but a higher intercept in the wholesale price equation. The evidence contradicts the standard models, and is consistent with the model of quantitative credit rationing.

Keywords: Pass-through rate, Financial Intermediary, Supply Chain, Market Power, Credit Rationing, Edible Oils, Bangladesh

JEL Codes:O12, L13, Q13

1 Introduction

The role of market power of trade intermediaries in earning high margins that unduly raise consumer prices has frequently been a matter of public concern. Such concerns underlie arguments for regulations, often taking extreme forms of outright bans on some intermediary layers, and, in some cases, jail term and even execution of traders. For example,

“For my part, I wish every one of them (speculators) had his devilish head shot off”. (Abraham Lincoln, quoted in Carpenter (1866, p. 84))

“For as long as we fail to treat speculators the way they deserve—with a bullet in the head—we will not get anywhere at all”. ((Vladimir Lenin, 1964, p. 311).)

In 1958 private trades in onions futures were banned in Chicago; distrust of private traders led to the establishment of marketing boards in many developing countries in 1950s and 1960s. However, disappointing results with the marketing boards led to agricultural market liberalization starting from the late 1970s. Lack of trust in middlemen traders in commodity markets nevertheless remains widespread and deeply ingrained; the price spiral in international commodity markets in 2007-2008 brought their role back into focus. In 2011, the Bangladesh government banned a layer of intermediaries called Delivery Order Traders (DOTs) in edible oils distribution trade, out of a concern that their market power was primarily responsible for the rising consumer prices since 2008. However, there is relatively little systematic evidence on the effects of such policy actions. More generally, there is a paucity of literature on the role of middlemen and price pass-through with imperfect competition in the context of developing countries.

In this paper we argue that the standard models of pass-through in the literature pay insufficient attention to the financing role of intermediaries. Specifically, if the financing intermediaries in a supply chain help relax quantitative credit constraints faced by downstream traders, banning them can have dramatically different implications for pass-through and price margins when compared to standard models of double marginalization of rents. We show this in the context of a model of symmetric Cournot competition with given concentration at each

layer. As in the recent work of Atkin and Donaldson (2016), a Bulow-Pfleiderer (1983) specification of downstream consumer demand generates explicit linear recursive expressions for prices at each layer in the absence of any credit rationing.² Pass-through rates are independent of cost levels, and depend only on concentration at successive layers and the curvature of the demand function. Removing an intermediate layer is equivalent to eliminating market power at that layer, which raises pass-through and lowers the intercept term in the downstream price equation. Extending the model to incorporate credit constrained downstream traders, and the role of upstream intermediaries in alleviating these credit constraints, we show that the effects of regulations can get reversed: if the credit rationing effect is strong enough, the pass-through rate falls while the intercept term rises as a result of removing the financing intermediary layer.

We test these contrasting predictions using daily wholesale and retail palm oil price data in Bangladesh spanning 2008-2013, a period which includes the drastic policy reform banning financing intermediaries called delivery order traders (DOTs) from the market. We compare estimated pass-through of shocks to import prices of crude palm (which constitutes 80% of oil refining costs) before and after the reform (which lasted approximately one year starting July 2011). The main econometric issue with this before-after approach (henceforth B-A approach) is that the estimated pass-through rates may be biased owing to the omission of other sources of distribution costs when they are correlated with the oil import price. The direction of the change in the pass-through rate estimated by the B-A approach is unbiased under the assumption that the correlation between the omitted distribution costs and imported crude price did not change as a result of the reform. However, the direction of bias in the change in the intercept term cannot be assessed without making additional assumptions regarding average distribution costs before and after the reform. We deal with this problem in two steps. First, we check the sensitivity of the B-A estimates and the direction of the omitted variables bias by including proxies for changes in distribution costs such as diesel price and exchange rate. Second, and more importantly, we develop a difference-in-difference strategy and compare changes in oil prices with the changes in wheat prices, which is also imported and incurs similar distribution (transport and storage) costs. We test and do not reject the parallel

²Our benchmark model without credit rationing is, however, different from that of Atkin and Donaldson (2016) as we incorporate financing intermediaries who provide low interest loans compared to the banks.

trend assumption underlying the DiD approach.

In the B-A analysis, we find a substantial fall in the pass-through rate (from 80% to 68%), statistically significant at the 5% level. Moreover, the estimated intercept term nearly doubled (the difference being significant at the 1% level). The increase in the intercept was large enough to make the net effect on consumer price positive. Consistent with the assumption of positive correlation of distribution costs with crude import prices due to factors unrelated to the reform, the B-A estimates are larger when we include proxies for distribution costs, and the DiD estimates are larger than the corresponding B-A estimates. We check subsequently that the DiD results are robust with respect to alternative specifications of oil import lags, duration of the reform and the pre-reform period. The credibility of the DiD design is strengthened by placebos for the timing of the reform and the affected commodity.

These results reject the double marginalization model of supply chains extended to include a layer of financing intermediaries providing low-interest credit, and are consistent with the model with credit rationing faced by downstream traders. The intuitive explanation is that the DOT ban resulted in more severe credit constraints faced by downstream wholesale and retail traders, resulting in a contraction in trade volumes which raised downstream prices. Moreover, the tightening of credit constraints effectively lowered price elasticity of derived demand functions faced by upstream refiners, resulting in higher refiner markups. These disruptions overwhelmed whatever reductions in market concentration resulted from the elimination of the DOTs from the market. This explanation is consistent with independent evidence from case-studies, as well as data on aggregate crude import volumes which contracted sharply (at a time when import prices were falling). It also helps explain why the reform was reversed, following pressure from palm oil refiners who were struggling to offload their accumulating inventories.

The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides details of the institutional setting of the palm oil supply chain in Bangladesh and the nature of the reform. Section 3 develops the theoretical analysis, followed by a discussion of estimation strategy in Section 4. Section 5 then describes the data and presents the empirical results. Section 6 discusses possible competing explanations, while Section 7 discusses related literature. Finally Section 8 concludes.

2 The Palm Oil Marketing Chain in Bangladesh and the 2011 Reform

2.1 Pre-Reform

We start with a brief description of the Bangladesh palm oil marketing chain before the DOT ban in 2011; a more detailed discussion is provided in Uddin and Taslim (2010). As the reform was effectively suspended by mid-2012, the current structure of the supply chain resembles the way it was organized prior to the reform. The chain consists of four layers: refiners, delivery order traders (DOTs), wholesalers and retailers. The refining segment is highly concentrated with only 9 refiners, some of them have considerable excess capacity. The refiners import crude palm oil from Malaysia and Indonesia and then refine it. While wholesalers can pick up refined oil directly from the refiners upon paying cash, such direct transactions between the wholesalers and the refiners are limited. The wholesalers mostly furnish a delivery order (DO) to take oil delivery, a paper document representing an entitlement to a defined quantity. DOs are purchased by DOTs from refiners, sometimes immediately after the crude oil is imported, and sold later to wholesalers. There are approximately 300 DOTs divided between two principal cities Dhaka and Chittagong, forming an intermediate layer between refiners and over 7000 wholesalers. Wholesalers mostly prefer to purchase through a DOT rather than directly from a refiner for two reasons: the credit implicitly provided by a DOT, and DOTs buy in bulk and get price discounts from the refiners part of which they can share with the wholesalers. Estimates from a trader survey we conducted in 2013 shows that about 32 percent of quantity transacted between the DOTs and wholesalers was on credit without collateral, based on long-term relationships.

The DOTs buy DOs for oil deliverable by the refiner after a stipulated period of time (usually 2 weeks). It is important to note that DOTs never take physical delivery of the oil: they are pure financial intermediaries. This is helpful for our empirical analysis, as the banning of DOTs cannot affect the distribution costs such as storage and transport costs directly. The DOT layer interacts vertically with the refiners upstream and the wholesalers downstream. In effect, they purchase refined oil from the refiners and re-sell it after a time lag to wholesalers.

There are also some horizontal transactions among DOTs, representing arbitrage, speculation or purchase by smaller DOTs from the large DOTs. The horizontal transactions among the DOTs have evolved into something like an embryonic commodity exchange in Moulovibazar in Dhaka and Khatunganj in Chittagong where speculators operate with the help of brokers, primarily during upswings in the international market. Our post-reform data period however coincided with a downswing in the international market when activities in the secondary (horizontal) DOT market were almost nonexistent.³ In our analysis, we focus on the pricing implications of market power and credit rationing across vertical layers in a static framework, and thus abstract from price dynamics, risk, or heterogeneity across traders within any layer.

2.2 The Reform

The policy reform focused on the DO layer of the market. The law banning DO (Delivery Order) transactions and instituting SO (Sales Order) dealers in its place (i.e., Essential Commodities Marketing and Distributor Appointment Order 2011) was passed on March 23, 2011. 90 days were allowed to implement the policy change, implying that the directive implementing the law came into effect on June 21, 2011.

It was argued by the government and popular media that in the DO system a few big players exert disproportionate market power and manipulate the market by strategically buying, holding and selling DOs. This layer was sought to be entirely eliminated in the new system, in which wholesalers were expected to purchase oil directly from refiners. In the SO system, new dealers were appointed for each “marketing area” (for example, upazila or municipality) selected by the refiners, and a dealer is allowed to buy oil “commensurate with” the size of the market. In total, 7388 dealers for edible oil were appointed by different refiners. While wholesalers were principally expected to become the new dealers, it would have been difficult to

³The DO layer is not a futures market, because there is no settlement at the end of the day. Also, unlike a futures contract, payment is made at the time of the DO contract, not at the delivery date. The fact that the DOTs pay ahead of the physical delivery implies that the refiners effectively get short-term loans. In return, the refiners provide storage for the oil, as the DOTs do not own any storage facilities. Thus the cost of storage can be thought of as implicit interest rate on the short-term loan a refiner gets from the DOT. The DO is also not a standard forward contract, because the stipulated delivery date is almost never enforced.

prevent previous DOTs from acquiring dealerships. This was the logic underlying the quantity restrictions on how much oil could be purchased by a dealer, so that even if an ex-DOT became a dealer he would not be able to engage in bulk purchases and sales of SOs. Hence the intent was to reduce market concentration within the supply chain.

However, the elimination of DOTs also meant disappearance of an important source of credit for wholesalers. Refiners were unable to step in to fill this gap because they lacked the information accumulated by the DOTs over decades. Accordingly, the wholesalers had to turn to banks for credit to finance dealership deposits and purchase of SOs for oil from the refiners. Many faced difficulty in obtaining sufficient credit. This made it difficult for the refiners to set up a new network of SO dealers. City Group, one of the largest refiners which accounted for nearly half of all new dealerships created, was forced to waive the required security deposits. A related problem was the lack of storage among wholesalers, who were expected to pick up refined oil earlier in the new system in the absence of the DOTs.

As a result of these problems, the wholesale-traders-turned-dealers were increasingly unable to pay for the required oil, and refiners began to accumulate stocks beyond their desired level of inventory. This prompted the refiners to look for alternative distribution channels; eventually they went back to some of the large DOTs to return into the business and undermine the new system. After approximately six months of the reform, the DOTs started to circumvent the quantity restrictions imposed, with the government taking little initiative to enforce these restrictions (presumably owing to pressure from refiners). This passivity set into motion forces that pushed back the marketing system towards the old DO system; within a year or so the old system was back in play.

3 Theory

We model a vertical chain with three layers: refiners, DOTs and wholesale traders (depicted below respectively by $i \in \{r, d, T\}$). Although the edible oil supply chain also includes retailers, we ignore them as the focus is on the effects of the elimination of the DOTs on wholesale prices. So we assume that wholesalers sell directly to final consumers. Owing to its recursive structure,

it is easy to extend the model to incorporate an additional fourth layer of retailers who sell to final consumers. Indeed, the model with a retail layer reduces to the one developed below when there are sufficiently many retailers that the market power at that layer is negligible.

We also abstract from product heterogeneity and horizontal asymmetries across traders at each layer.⁴ Concentration i.e., the number of (identical) traders at each layer is exogenously given: the number of traders in layer i is denoted as N_i . They engage in Cournot competition, taking as given prices of the intermediate input they purchase from the layer above (which determine their unit costs). We normalize units so that one unit of crude oil produces one unit of refined oil. Besides oil costs, traders at level i incur costs C_i per unit: for refiners this includes refining and storage costs; for wholesalers this includes transport, storage and other distribution costs. Since the DOTs do not incur transport and storage costs, the per unit distribution costs for them are likely to be small.

Production decisions and distribution flow vertically downwards. First, the crude oil import price P_m is determined in the international market. Then refiners decide how much to import and refine, taking the import price as given, but incorporating the effect of their quantity decisions on the price at which they sell to traders one level below (the DOTs). This determines total unit costs of traders at the next layer, who then decide their quantities, and so on.

The inverse demand function among consumers is assumed to take the Bulow and Pfleiderer (1983) form:

$$P_T(Q) = \alpha - \eta Q^\delta; \quad \alpha, \eta, \delta > 0 \quad (1)$$

where P_T denotes the price at which wholesale traders sell to consumers.⁵

We now explain the role of credit, which arises from a time-lag associated with the refining and distribution process. There are two dates: $t = 0$ and $t = 1$. At $t = 0$, the crude oil is imported at price P_m , and DOs are sold by the refiners at price P_r to DOTs who in turn sell them at price P_d to the wholesalers, and, finally, the wholesalers take delivery of oil from

⁴This is a reasonable assumption in our empirical application because there is little product differentiation in the Palm oils market.

⁵An alternative to the Bulow-Pfleiderer demand specification is the constant elasticity demand, widely used in the theoretical literature. A constant elasticity demand function implies a zero intercept in the pass-through equation. The evidence rejects the null hypothesis of a zero intercept at the 5 percent significance level in all of the pass-through regressions reported in this paper.

the refiners and transport to the destination market. At $t = 1$ the refined oil is sold to the consumers by the wholesalers at price P_T . All distribution costs of DOTs and wholesalers are also incurred at $t = 0$.⁶ DOTs are not constrained with respect to the amount of credit they have access to, and incur the lowest borrowing costs compared to refiners and wholesalers.⁷ Being informal lenders with specialized expertise in financing, they can lend at a cost of i_d per taka, which is lower than (or equal to) the rate i_b charged by banks. This difference arises owing to lower transaction costs (screening and loan collection expenses) they incur compared with formal financial institutions. Hence DOTs provide loans to wholesalers to cover the time-lag between $t = 0$ and 1. Wholesalers finance their working capital needs at $t = 0$ by borrowing from DOTs. They need to borrow $P_d + C_T$ for per unit of oil purchased. These loans are repaid at $t = 1$ after they receive cash payments from consumers.

Loans are subject to moral hazard: a wholesaler could decide not to repay a loan at $t = 1$. Loan default is punished by lenders with a severity depending on who the lender is. DOTs are able to impose more punitive sanctions on defaulters than banks, due to their access to punishments not limited to purely legal routes. The maximal pecuniary cost of sanctions imposed by DOTs and banks respectively are denoted by R_d , R_b with $R_d > R_b$. We treat these sanctions as given.⁸ Consequently the borrowing of any given wholesaler has to satisfy the constraint that the amount of repayment due to a DO trader cannot exceed R_d .

DOTs compete with one another (and with banks) in the market for lending to wholesalers. For simplicity we assume they compete over loan contracts in Bertrand fashion, thereby end up

⁶In addition to the transport costs incurred by the wholesalers, these may include worker wages which are paid in advance at $t = 0$. The only role of this assumption is to simplify the notation; the cost expressions need to be adjusted if distribution costs are incurred at $t = 1$.

⁷This is motivated by the evidence from a survey of the edible oils market in Dhaka and Chittagong in 2013 reported in Emran et. al, (2015). See also the discussion in Taslim and Uddin (2010). Among other factors, black money generated by tax evasion is likely to be an important source of DOT finance which cannot be deposited in banks to earn interest income. In some cases, the religious injunctions against earning interest income may reduce the opportunity costs of own funds for DOTs, especially among the ethnic Bihari DOTs in the Dhaka market.

⁸It is easy to extend the model to settings where sanctions are endogenous, e.g., in a dynamic setting where sanctions involve cutting off access to credit and the oil market in future. DOTs could engage in such collective punishments as in Kandori (1992) or Greif (1993): all DOTs could refuse to sell DOs or lend to any wholesaler who defaults on a loan with any DOT. If prices are stationary, the cost of these sanctions imposed on defaulters will depend on prices, which will alter the expression for credit ceilings derived below. This complicates the analysis without affecting the results qualitatively.

earning zero profits in equilibrium. This implies that wholesalers would be able to borrow at an interest rate of i_d . However, owing to the moral hazard problem the size of their loan would be subject to a ceiling given by $\frac{R_d}{1+i_d}$. This in turn translates into a ceiling on how many DOs the wholesaler can purchase; q DOs generate a need to borrow $[P_d + C_T]q$. Hence the ceiling on q is given by

$$q \leq \frac{R_d}{(1+i_d)(P_d + C_T)} \quad (2)$$

We focus on the case where the wholesalers do not find it profitable to borrow from banks to finance oil purchase if they have access to DOT loans.⁹

Taking the price of DOs (besides conjectured aggregate quantity Q_- of other wholesalers) as given, each wholesaler decides q , how many DOs to purchase. This is chosen to maximize profit

$$P_T(Q_- + q)q - (1+i_d)(P_d + C_T)q \quad (3)$$

subject to (2).

We can then solve for an equilibrium in the game played between wholesalers, taking DO price P_d as given. This generates the derived demand function for DOs from wholesalers. The DO price is determined by equating aggregate demand from wholesalers with aggregate supply from DOTs.¹⁰

To ensure that the market does not shut down, we assume

$$\alpha > (1+i_b)[P_m + C_r + C_d + C_T] \quad (4)$$

3.1 The Standard Model without Credit Rationing

If loan default sanctions (R_d , R_b) are large enough, the credit ceilings will not be binding. Then each wholesaler maximizes profit (3) without being subject to any quantity constraint. Since the interest rate charged by the banks is higher, the wholesalers do not have any incentives to

⁹We discuss the implications of this assumption with and without credit rationing below.

¹⁰This is based on the standard assumption underlying the Cournot model that an auctioneer clears the market (for DOs between DOTs and wholesalers). We speculate that the same equilibrium will result in the absence of an auctioneer, as in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) where DOTs choose their capacity first, and then engage in Bertrand competition in selling DOs in conjunction with loans to wholesalers.

borrow from banks.

A symmetric equilibrium among wholesalers results in consumer price

$$P_T = \alpha \left[1 - \frac{N_T}{N_T + \delta} \right] + \frac{N_T}{N_T + \delta} (1 + i_d) (P_d + C_T) \quad (5)$$

implying a pass-through rate of $\frac{N_T}{N_T + \delta}$ which is rising in N_T , and converging to 1 as N_T approaches ∞ .

Having solved for the equilibrium at the wholesaler level resulting from any given DO price, we can roll back to the earlier stage where DOTs make quantity decisions. Combining (5) and (3) we obtain the derived demand function facing DOTs:

$$P_d(Q) = \frac{1}{1 + i_d} \left[\alpha - \frac{N_T + \delta}{N_T} \eta Q^\delta \right] - C_T \quad (6)$$

The profit of a representative DOT selecting DO quantity q when the remaining DOTs select a total of Q_- when P_r is the price at which DOs can be bought:

$$[P_d(Q_- + q) - P_r - C_d] q \quad (7)$$

Routine calculations yield the following expression for the symmetric equilibrium selling price of DOs

$$P_d = \left[\frac{\alpha}{1 + i_d} - C_T \right] \left[1 - \frac{N_d}{N_d + \delta} \right] + \frac{N_d}{N_d + \delta} [P_r + C_d] \quad (8)$$

Using (5), this in turn implies a downstream price of

$$P_T = \alpha \left[1 - \frac{N_T}{N_T + \delta} \frac{N_d}{N_d + \delta} \right] + \frac{N_T}{N_T + \delta} \frac{N_d}{N_d + \delta} (1 + i_d) (P_r + C_d + C_T) \quad (9)$$

if P_r is the price at which DOTs buy DOs.

Proceeding in similar fashion back to the refiner level, we can solve for the equilibrium P_r and end up with the following expression for wholesale (and also retail) price as a function of

oil import price:

$$P_T = \alpha \left[1 - \frac{N_T}{N_T + \delta} \frac{N_d}{N_d + \delta} \frac{N_r}{N_r + \delta} \right] + \frac{N_T}{N_T + \delta} \frac{N_d}{N_d + \delta} \frac{N_r}{N_r + \delta} (1 + i_d)(P_m + C_r + C_d + C_T) \quad (10)$$

The pass-through of oil import price to the consumer price is the product of σ_i across successive layers, where $\sigma_i \equiv \frac{N_i}{N_i + \delta}$ is a measure of competitiveness in layer i . The downstream price is a convex combination of the demand intercept α and total unit cost (aggregating import, refining, distribution and financing costs). Rising competitiveness at any layer raises the pass-through rate and lowers the consumer price (given (4)).

What does this model predict about the effects of a reform which bans the entire DOT layer from functioning? Then wholesalers buy directly from refiners, financing their purchase by borrowing from banks instead of the DOTs.¹¹ Under the assumption of no credit rationing (i.e., wholesalers face no credit ceilings in borrowing from banks, as R_b is large enough), wholesaler per unit costs rise owing to a rise in the borrowing interest rate from i_d to i_b . This tends to raise the wholesale price. On the other hand, the reduction in concentration at the DOT layer has an opposite effect of lowering P_T . Moreover, DOT costs C_d are no longer incurred. The net effect on the wholesale (and consumer) price is ambiguous, depending on the relative strength of either effect (i.e., the size of $i_b - i_d$ compared with N_d and C_d).¹² The post-reform price is given by

$$\hat{P}_T = \alpha \left[1 - \frac{N_T}{N_T + \delta} \frac{N_r}{N_r + \delta} \right] + \frac{N_T}{N_T + \delta} \frac{N_r}{N_r + \delta} (1 + i_b)(P_m + C_r + C_T) \quad (11)$$

Although the net effect on consumer prices is uncertain, the above model yields unambiguous predictions regarding the changes in both the intercept of the price equation and the pass-through rate following the reform. The intercept term becomes smaller while the pass-through

¹¹The underlying assumption is that following the ban DOTs are not just unable to trade in oil, but also lend to wholesalers. This is plausible as a large part of the loanable funds of DOTs are funded by their profits from buying and selling DOs. Moreover, in a dynamic setting the sanctions DOTs impose on defaulting wholesalers involved refusing to sell them any DOs. Such sanctions cannot be used if DOTs are banned from functioning in the oil market.

¹²The effect of elimination of C_d is likely to be small, as the DOTs do not take physical delivery of oils, transport and storage costs incurred by them is zero.

rate of the oil import price to P_T must go up as a result of the reform, as concentration declines and the interest cost of wholesalers rise ($i_b > i_d$). Post-reform the pass-through rate equals $\frac{N_T}{N_T+\delta} \frac{N_r}{N_r+\delta} (1+i_b)$, as against $\frac{N_T}{N_T+\delta} \frac{N_d}{N_d+\delta} \frac{N_r}{N_r+\delta} (1+i_d)$ prior to the reform, and the intercept declines from $\alpha \left[1 - \frac{N_T}{N_T+\delta} \frac{N_d}{N_d+\delta} \frac{N_r}{N_r+\delta} \right]$ to $\alpha \left[1 - \frac{N_T}{N_T+\delta} \frac{N_r}{N_r+\delta} \right]$ following the reform. These predictions can be tested empirically.

3.2 The Model with Binding Credit Constraints

When default sanctions R_d , R_b are low enough, the credit constraint (2) is likely to bind. Then the best response of a representative wholesaler to DO price P_d and aggregate quantity Q_- of all other wholesalers in the pre-reform situation is

$$q(Q_-, P_d) = \min\{\bar{q}(P_d), q^*(Q_-, P_d)\} \quad (12)$$

where

$$\bar{q}(P_d) = \frac{R_d}{(1+i_d)(P_d + C_T)} \quad (13)$$

is the constrained demand where the credit constraint binds, while $q^*(Q, P_d)$ denotes the corresponding unconstrained demand, which is the value of q that solves the first order condition

$$\alpha - (1+i_d)(P_d + C_T) = \eta[(Q_- + q)^\delta + \delta q(Q_- + q)^{\delta-1}] \quad (14)$$

The implicit assumption in the above formulation is that the wholesalers borrow from the DOTs, but do not borrow from the banks in the pre-reform period even when they are quantity rationed. This is a plausible assumption when the amount of credit offered by the DOTs (R_d) is not too small, and the interest rate differential between the bank loans and DOT loans ($i_b - i_d$) is large enough.¹³

¹³This simplifies the exposition. The conclusions regarding pricing and pass-through implications of credit provision by DOTs in relaxing the credit constraint faced by downstream traders are robust to the alternative assumption that, in the initial equilibrium, the wholesalers use both DOT and Bank credit, but still face binding credit constraint.

The credit constraint does not bind in the symmetric equilibrium if

$$\frac{N_T}{N_T + \delta} \frac{1}{\eta} [\alpha - (1 + i_d)(P_d + C_T)] \leq \left[\frac{N_T R_d}{(1 + i_d)(P_d + C_T)} \right]^\delta \quad (15)$$

while if this condition is violated, the symmetric equilibrium with a binding credit constraint involves each wholesaler selecting

$$\bar{q} = \frac{R_d}{(1 + i_d)(P_d + C_T)} \quad (16)$$

The residual demand curve facing DOTs is now

$$P_d(Q) = \frac{1}{Q} \frac{N_T R_d}{1 + i_d} - C_T \quad (17)$$

instead of (6). The resulting Cournot equilibrium among DOTs given P_r is

$$P_d = \left(1 - \frac{1}{N_d}\right)^{-1} (P_r + C_d) - C_T \quad (18)$$

which yields a Cournot equilibrium among refiners that ultimately results in consumer price

$$P_T = \alpha - \eta \left[\left(1 - \frac{1}{N_r}\right) \left(1 - \frac{1}{N_d}\right) \frac{N_T R_d}{(1 + i_d)(P_m + C_r + C_d)} \right]^\delta \quad (19)$$

In contrast to the case where the credit constraint does not bind, this is nonlinear, with the pass-through rate no longer independent of the crude import price.

The marginal pass-through rate equals

$$\frac{\partial P_T}{\partial P_m} = \eta \delta \left[\left(1 - \frac{1}{N_r}\right) \left(1 - \frac{1}{N_d}\right) \frac{N_T R_d}{(1 + i_d)} \right]^\delta [P_m + C_r + C_d]^{-(1+\delta)} \quad (20)$$

which is increasing in R_d . A decline in credit limit (i.e., R_d) shifts the residual demand curve facing DOTs inward, and reduces the sensitivity of the consumer prices to changes in oil refining costs.

Following the DOT ban, wholesalers borrow from banks at a higher interest rate i_b and are

subject to lower credit limit $\frac{R_b}{1+i_b}$. If credit constraints were binding in the pre-reform situation, they will continue to bind following the reform. The resulting equilibrium will involve

$$\hat{P}_T = \alpha - \eta \left[\left(1 - \frac{1}{N_r} \right) \frac{N_T R_b}{(1+i_b)(P_m + C_r)} \right]^\delta \quad (21)$$

and a marginal pass-through rate

$$\frac{\partial \hat{P}_T}{\partial P_m} = \eta \delta \left[\left(1 - \frac{1}{N_r} \right) \frac{N_T R_b}{(1+i_b)} \right]^\delta [P_m + C_r]^{-(1+\delta)} \quad (22)$$

The greater severity of credit constraints ($\frac{R_b}{1+i_b} < \frac{R_d}{1+i_d}$) now reduces the pass-through rate, which counters the increase owing to lowered concentration (equivalent to $N_d \rightarrow \infty$) and reduction in dealer costs ($C_d \rightarrow 0$). If the former effect is strong enough, the pass-through rate can now decline. The intensification of credit constraints also tends to raise the general level of P_T , i.e., the estimated intercept term, by shifting the oil supply curve inwards. The predictions about the effects of the reform on the intercept of the price equation and the the pass-trough rate are thus opposite to the standard model when credit contraction due to DOT ban is strong enough: the intercept goes up while pass-through declines after the reform.

4 Estimation Strategy

We utilize daily data on crude palm import price and domestic wholesale price to estimate the pass-through equation and how it changed following the reform. In order to test the standard model, we estimate the following equation

$$P_t^k = \gamma_k + \beta_k P_{tm} + \beta_k C_t + \epsilon_t \quad (23)$$

analogous to equations (10, 11), where $k = b, a$ refers to the regime (before and after the reform respectively), t denotes the date, the dependent variable P_t^k is the wholesale price during regime k , the regressor P_{tm} is the crude palm import price, and C_t denotes the sum of refining and distribution costs. The pass-through rate β_k equals the product of competition variables $\frac{N_i}{N_i + \delta}$

across various stages, and the interest rate at which wholesalers borrow. The key prediction of the standard double marginalization model is that $\beta_a > \beta_b$, owing to a rise in competition and the interest rate following the DOT ban. The change in the intercept $\gamma_a - \gamma_b$ is of independent interest, as it helps estimate the effect of the reform on the level of downstream prices. The standard model predicts that $\gamma_a - \gamma_b < 0$. Hence we are interested in running a regression of the form

$$P_t = \theta_0 + \theta_1 d_R + \theta_2 [P_{tm} + C_t] + \theta_3 d_R * [P_{tm} + C_t] + \epsilon_t \quad (24)$$

where d_R is a regime dummy (1 after the reform, 0 before), and identifying the signs of coefficients of the reform dummy $\theta_1 (= \gamma_a - \gamma_b)$ and its interaction with the import price $\theta_3 (= \beta_a - \beta_b)$. We refer to this as the before-after (B-A) regression.

The key difficulty is that we do not have data on costs of refiners, and financing and distribution costs of wholesalers. If these costs are correlated with the import price, the estimated pass-through rate will be biased. However, our main interest is to infer the direction of *change* in the pass-through rate, i.e., the sign of θ_3 . Denoting the coefficient on oil import price in a regression of c_t on p_{tm} by ρ_k in regime k , the estimated pass-through rate is $\hat{\beta}_k = \beta_k(1 + \rho_k)$. Under the assumption that the correlation between c_t and p_{tm} did not change as a result of the reform, i.e., $\rho_a = \rho_b$, then clearly we can infer the direction of change in pass-through rate from a before after comparison. More generally, when $\rho_a \leq \rho_b$, we have $\hat{\beta}_a > \hat{\beta}_b$ only if $\beta_a > \beta_b$. In contrast, when $\rho_a \geq \rho_b$, we have $\hat{\beta}_a < \hat{\beta}_b$ only if $\beta_a < \beta_b$. The bias in the B-A estimate of the intercept term in regime k equals $\beta_k c^0_k$ where $c^0_k = (\bar{c}_k - \rho_k \bar{P}_{mk})$ denotes the intercept term in the regression of distribution costs c_t on the crude oil import price P_{tm} in regime k . Inferring the direction of change in the intercept term is therefore not possible, without making assumptions regarding the before-after difference in average distribution costs.

Prior information concerning the sign and magnitude of ρ across policy regimes can be helpful in understanding the extent of bias in the B-A estimates. One would expect that $\rho > 0$, i.e., refining and distribution costs are positively correlated with the palm import price, e.g., both being driven by collinear movements in international crude palm oil prices, fuel prices (diesel), and exchange rates. A higher fuel price or exchanger rate is also expected to lead to higher distribution costs which in turn results in higher wholesale and retail prices. However,

diesel price is not market determined in Bangladesh, but set by the government. The correlation between wholesale food prices and diesel price may be negative in this case because of political economic reasons; it is more likely for a government to increase diesel price when the consumer prices of basic necessities are low. The upshot is that it is not possible to pin down the direction of omitted variables bias from a priori arguments alone.

Using data on diesel price, we find some evidence in favor of the assumption that $\rho_a > \rho_b \geq 0$. For example, the correlation between diesel price and crude oils import price was virtually zero in pre-reform period as government controls decoupled the domestic diesel price, but the correlation was 0.45 in the post-reform period as government allowed more flexibility in price setting in the gas stations. In this case, the pass-through rate in the post-reform period is overestimated by OLS regression, and as a consequence, the effects of the reform is underestimated by a B-A regression if the true impact of the reform was to reduce pass-through rate, i.e., $\beta_a < \beta_b$. The implied direction of bias in the intercept term is, however, not unambiguous. While $\rho_a > \rho_b$ implies $c_a^0 < c_b^0$, ceteris paribus, the bias in the estimated intercept in general would depend on the average import prices and the average distribution costs across policy regimes. In our data, the average import prices of crude palm oils is higher in the post reform period, which suggests that any increase in the intercept in the post-reform period may be underestimated by a B-A regression.

One way of dealing with the bias in the B-A estimates is to add variables that proxy for refining and distribution costs, such as the diesel price and exchange rate.¹⁴ A second approach is to compare price movements in palm oil with another commodity such as wheat which, in Bangladesh, is primarily imported from abroad, and is subject to similar transport and storage costs. This would amount to a DiD regression using data which pools oil and wheat:

$$P_t = \theta_0 + \theta_1 d_R + \theta_2 P_{tm} + \theta_3 (d_R * P_{tm}) + \lambda_1 d_O + \lambda_2 (d_O * P_{tm}) + \lambda_3 (d_O * d_R * P_{tm}) + \epsilon_t^* \quad (25)$$

where d_O denotes an oil dummy. Then λ_2 and λ_3 would provide estimates of the reform effect

¹⁴Most of the trucks run on diesel and the privately owned electricity generators also use diesel. Electricity outage and load shading were common in Bangladesh during the study period. Since almost all transport equipment are imported into Bangladesh, exchange rate changes can directly affect a major component of costs in the transport sector.

on the intercept and pass-through rates in oil. Since the storage rental rates and transport rates do not vary across palm oil and wheat, the distribution costs in oil and wheat will be positively correlated over time, and the estimates from the DiD design will be less biased than the before-after regression using data on oil alone.

A final issue in understanding the effects of the reform on pass-through rate is possible confounding effect of changes in bank interest rate in the post-reform period because of factors unrelated to the reform such as central bank policy. According to our benchmark model without credit rationing, the pass-through rate in the post-reform period depends on the interest rate charged by the banks, as the wholesalers deprived of the credit from DOTs turn to banks for financing their purchases. If the bank interest rate changes due to central bank policy independent of the policy reform in edible oils market, we may incorrectly attribute the changes in the pass-through rate due to changes in interest rate to the effects of reform, under the null hypothesis that there is no quantitative credit rationing in post-reform period. Using data on interest rates on short-term bank loans, we provide evidence that the conclusions in this paper are not due to changes in bank interest rates.

5 Data and Empirical Results

We use daily price data for palm oil and wheat at various stages of the supply chain from the Department of Agricultural Marketing (DAM) unit of Ministry of Agriculture, Bangladesh Government. These data are very similar to daily price data reported by The Trading Corporation of Bangladesh (TCB) for major urban centers. We utilize the DAM data owing to longer coverage and across multiple commodities. Daily international prices of wheat are derived from the data stream of Chicago Board of Trading. Crude palm oil price data is obtained from the Malaysian Palm oil Board.¹⁵ Lentil import prices are taken from the National Bureau of Revenue daily import data. Our sample extends from January 24, 2008 to October 4, 2012. There are however some data gaps due to lack of price data during weekends and holidays as well as some missing data in the DAM original data set. Our total sample sizes for palm oil

¹⁵Crude palm oil was listed in the TCB in January 2009. We compared TCB data with Malaysian Palm Board data on daily palm oil prices, there are nearly identical.

and wheat are 966 days spread over 57 months.

Table 1 provides summary statistics for wholesale, retail and import prices of palm oil and wheat prior to the reform. Figure 1 plots retail price data for palm oil along with the crude import price over the sample period. The close co-movement between the two series is apparent, with a margin that moves counter-cyclically, suggesting a pass-through rate between 0 and 1. The two vertical lines in the middle of 2011 correspond to dates of announcement and implementation of the reform. The international price was rising continuously from late 2008 onwards, until a few months prior to the onset of the reform. This was reversed thereafter immediately for a few months following the reform. Despite this the retail price remained stationary, resulting in an increase in the margin, and suggesting that the pass-through rate had declined following the reform.

Figure 2 compares movements in wholesale trading margins for palm oil and wheat prior to the reform: the two tend to move together with the wheat margin tending to lead. Table 2 provides average wholesale and retail margins for the two commodities both before and after the reform. Margins are computed either using the current or 4-week lagged import price. We see a 25% or higher rise in oil margins while the wheat margin fell slightly. Figure 3 shows the margin estimates and the 95 percent confidence interval, providing suggestive evidence that the increase in the oil margin relative to the wheat margin after the reform is statistically and economically significant.

Table 3 presents the results of the B-A and DiD regressions for the wholesale price as the dependent variable and the 4-week lagged import price as the independent variable of interest. We check the robustness of the results later with alternative lags for import price.¹⁶ The regressions include year and quarter dummies, and a dummy for the Ramadan period when food prices tend to spike. We exclude data for the few months between the date of announcement and implementation of the reform.¹⁷ Data for two years prior to the announcement are compared with data following policy implementation. Based on a correlogram analysis of price data, we

¹⁶The 4-week lag is chosen to reflect the fact that it takes about 10-14 days to transport the crude oil from Malaysia to Chittagong port after an order is placed, and then the oil needs to be transported to the mills and refined which require approximately 2 more weeks. The conclusions of this paper, however, do not depend on this particular lag assumption. See the evidence based on alternative lags below.

¹⁷Later we show that the conclusions are robust to the inclusion of data for these months in the sample.

allow for AR (1) process in the residuals. The null hypothesis of a unit root in the residual is rejected at the 1 percent level by augmented Dickey-Fuller and Panel unit root tests for all of the price regressions reported in this paper. For example, for the DiD regressions, the Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003) test rejects the null hypothesis of unit root in the residuals for both oil and wheat at the 1 percent level against the alternative hypothesis that at least one of them is stationary. The evidence against the null hypothesis of unit root in the panel of residuals is confirmed by the Breitung (2000) and Harris and Tzavais (199) tests where the alternative hypothesis is that both residuals are stationary. Standard errors are corrected for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation using the Newey-West (1987) procedure.

The B-A regression shows a significant fall in the pass-through rate following the reform, and a significant rise in the intercept term. According to the B-A estimates without proxies for distribution costs (column 1 of Table 3), the pass-through rate declines from a point estimate of 0.81 to 0.62, while the point estimate of the intercept term rises from 22 to 41. This is inconsistent with the model of the supply chain without credit rationing, and consistent with predictions of the credit rationing model. The B-A estimates of the effects of the reform become larger when we include diesel price and exchange rate as proxies for distribution costs (see column 2 of Table 3).¹⁸ This suggests that the omitted distribution costs result in underestimation of the effects of the ban on DOTs. The results are reinforced in the DiD regression (column 3 without controls, and column 4 with controls): the fall in the pass-through rate and the rise in the intercept are both larger compared to the corresponding B-A estimates. The evidence that the fall in pass-through rate after the DOT ban is underestimated in B-A regression is consistent with the assumption that the the omitted distribution costs are positively correlated with import price, and the correlation became stronger in the post reform period. The fact that the increase in intercept is underestimated in the B-A on the other hand suggests that the combined effect of a higher crude import price and a higher ρ after reform is strong enough to make $c_a^0 < c_b^0$. A comparison of the DiD estimates in columns (3) and (4) of Table 3 shows that, unlike the B-A estimates, the DiD estimates are not affected substantially when proxies

¹⁸Interestingly, the coefficient of diesel price in the wholesale price equation is negative, consistent with the political economy argument that the government raises diesel price when consumer prices of food and other necessities are low.

of distribution costs are included. This suggests that the DiD design accounts for the omitted distribution costs well.

Table 4A shows that the results are robust with respect to alternative lags for the oil import price.¹⁹ These correspond to alternative hypotheses concerning the way refiners set prices for refined oil, based on historic or current cost, and alternative specifications of the lag between the time of import of crude oil and sale of refined oil. Longer lags weaken the BA regression results (which nevertheless remain statistically significant), while the DiD estimates are comparatively unaffected. The first two columns of Table 4B shows that the results continue to hold when the pre-reform sample is expanded to include three rather than two years. Columns 3 and 4 show they also hold when we include the ‘announcement’ period between the announcement and implementation dates, with separate intercept and pass-through interaction dummies for the announcement period included in the regression (estimated coefficients of these are not shown in the table).

The exact period for which the reform lasted is unclear, as the ban on operation of DOTs unraveled gradually a few months after implementation. According to informal accounts, the reform was in place for slightly less than a year. The first two columns of Table 5 thus separates the post-reform period into the first 9 months following the reform, from the post-9 month period. Both B-A and DiD results show that the effects were concentrated in the first 9 months; the post-9 month period is statistically indistinguishable from the pre-reform period. Not surprisingly, the first 9-month effects are larger in magnitude compared to previous tables which pooled all post-reform dates into a single post-reform period. The last two columns of Table 5 separates the first 6 months following the reform with the post-6-month period. The BA results are similar to those in the first two columns, while the DiD results show some effects on the intercept term lingering even during the post-6-month period.

Table 6A tests the parallel trend assumption underlying the analysis. We move the reform date to one year prior to the actual reform, whereupon the significant effects in both BA and DiD regressions in Table 3 disappear. Table 6B carries out an alternative placebo test, replacing

¹⁹The specification used in Tables 4A-7B correspond to specification in odd columns in Table 3 without diesel price and exchange rate as additional controls. The conclusions remain intact if we include the proxies for distribution costs. The results are available upon request.

oil with lentil, a different commodity whose supply chain was not affected by the reform. The corresponding DiD results show no effect of the oil reform.

Our analysis predicts that the reform affected the wholesale margin but did not directly affect the wholesale-retail margin, since it affected DOTs who intermediated between the refiners and the wholesalers. This would imply that the effects on the retail margin (retail price less the oil import price) would be similar to those of the wholesale margin. Table 7A presents results for the retail margin. These are very similar to the results in Table 3 for the wholesale margin. Table 7B shows that the effects for the first 9 months following the reform had similar but larger effects on the retail margin (compared with the effects on the wholesale margin shown in Table 5A).

6 Supplementary Evidence and Alternative Explanations

In this section, we provide additional evidence consistent with our finding of an increase in the wholesale price of palm oil resulting from intensified credit constraints of wholesalers following the reform. Choudhury and Clara Costa (2012) provide case studies of the experience of two refiners (Nurjahan Group and Bangladesh Edible Oils Limited) following the reform. Owing to a drop in demand from wholesalers, these two refiners accumulated excess inventory, and thereafter lowered their imports of crude oil by 39% between 2010 and 2011. Consistent with this account, aggregate imports of crude oil for Bangladesh as a whole fell following the reform: see Figure 4 which plots monthly imports for 2009-10 and 2010-11. A simple before-after regression indicates a statistically significant decline following the reform (the coefficient of reform dummy is -20.15 which is significant at the 5 percent level ($t=2.026$)). It is striking that this happened during a period when world oil prices were declining, reversing the trend for the previous three years (see Figure 1).

In 2013, two years following the reform, we conducted a survey of edible oil traders in the Dhaka and Chittagong markets (Emran et al. (2015)). Data on 6176 transactions between DOTs and wholesalers revealed that 30% of transactions between DOTs and wholesalers were on credit, and supplier credit from DOTs accounted for 32 percent of the volume. A retrospective

survey we conducted in February 2016 of a sub-sample of 50 wholesalers in these markets indicated that wholesalers buying on credit from DOTs prior to the reform experienced a 45% reduction in volumes. This suggests that aggregate supply at the wholesale level dropped by approximately 15% after the reform owing to the difficulties faced by wholesale traders in obtaining credit in the post-reform period. There are no reliable estimates of the price elasticity of retail demand for palm oil in Bangladesh, the estimate for USA is 1.24 (Kojima et al. (2014)), and 1.62 for India (Srinivasan (2005)). The evidence is consistent with the idea that elasticity is higher in poorer countries. A plausible estimate for the elasticity in Bangladesh is 1.7-1.8. This yields a back-of-the-envelope estimate of a price increase of 8.33% - 8.80% owing to the 15% quantity reduction after reform. The DiD estimates in column (4) of Table 3 imply that the wholesale price was 9.8 percent higher as a result of credit contraction following DOT ban (evaluated at the average world price in post-reform period).

A possible alternative explanation of the lower pass-through rate estimated after the reform is that the wholesalers always rely on the banks for credit and the interest rate charged by banks declined after the reform because of central bank policy shift. A lower interest rate would reduce the pass-through estimate according to our benchmark model without credit rationing. The evidence on bank interest rate rejects this explanation; the average bank interest rate was higher in the post reform period; the average interest rate on short-term bank loans increased from 11.46 to 13.38 in the post-reform period.

Another alternative explanation of the rise in wholesale price is that the reform increased the market power of refiners who were selling directly to wholesalers, rather than indirectly through the DOTs prior to the reform. This would have implied an increase in total profits earned by refiners, who would have an interest in ensuring that the reform was not reversed. Interviews with refiners and traders, as well as the retrospective survey of 50 traders we conducted in February 2016 instead report that refiners who were unhappy with the reform (owing to the limited take up from wholesale dealers) surreptitiously went back to the DOTs to offload their accumulated inventory. This indicates that the refiners' profit was adversely affected by the reform, consistent with the prediction of the credit rationing model.

Explanations based on increased search costs are also unlikely to account for a price increase

resulting from the reform. These search costs did not seem significant prior to the reform, as DOTs operate within a very narrow market area in Dhaka and Chittagong, and wholesalers could find out prices quoted by DOTs by making a telephone call to their contacts in these market areas. Following the reform, there were only nine refiners from whom they could purchase; knowing what prices they were charging would have been even easier than checking prices charged by the 300-400 DOTs previously.

7 Related Literature

The evidence and analysis presented in this paper is most closely related to a large literature on imperfect pass-through of international prices and exchange rate variations to domestic producer and consumer prices (e.g., recent contributions by Goldberg and Hellerstein (2008), Nakamura and Zerom (2010), Berman et al. (2012), Bonnet et al. (2013), and recent surveys by Burstein and Gopinath (2013), Campa and Goldberg (2008)). Weyl and Fabinger (2013) presents a unifying framework for incidence with imperfect competition. This framework has been fruitfully utilized in the context of developing countries by Atkin and Donaldson (2016). Analogous to our approach, they use the Bulow-Pfleiderer (1983) specification of demand to derive a constant pass-through rate that depends only on market concentration and demand curvature. They use this to recover trade costs from spatial price differences. As in the standard model, intermediaries in their model play a role in trade and physical distribution rather than financing, and contract frictions such as credit constraints play no role.

The literature in development economics has paid more attention to contracting frictions, resulting from adverse selection, moral hazard and enforcement problems. Models of interlinked trade-credit relationships have appeared in Braverman and Stiglitz (1984), Bardhan (1984, 1989). Burkart and Ellingsen (2004) show that relative illiquidity of commodities implies that it is easier to provide trade credit compared to a pure credit contract. This argument is relevant for our application, because a DO is considerably less liquid than money, as it may not be easy for a wholesaler to find a DO buyer willing to pay cash without offering significant discounts. More important, the DOTs rely on accumulated information about the wholesalers to minimize

adverse selection and moral hazard, and default information is shared quickly among the DOTs in a market, similar to multilateral punishment scheme a la Greif (1993). Information and monitoring advantages have been identified as important factors for supplier credit (see, for example, Smith (1987)).

Recent empirical work in developing countries on intermediaries and commodity supply chains have examined pass-through of international or retail prices to farmgate prices when trade intermediaries operate as middlemen between farmers and retail or foreign buyers (Casaburi et al. (2013), Fafchamps and Hill (2008), Minten and Kyle (1999)). Many of these focus on search frictions to explain pass-through patterns, while Mitra et al (2013) consider implications of asymmetric price information. The role of intermediaries in providing trade credit does not appear in these papers. Our paper therefore provides an interesting complement to this literature.

Although there has been a renewed interest in the domestic food markets in developing countries in response to price shocks in the international market, most studies (e.g., Ivanic et al. (2012)) estimate the effects of higher international prices on domestic prices (pass-through) in reduced form regressions without a theoretical model, and the focus is usually on the implications of higher consumer prices for poverty. These studies do not attempt to understand the role of intermediaries or the effects of efforts to regulate their activities.

8 Concluding Comments

This paper extends the model of vertical supply chain with imperfect competition to incorporate financing intermediaries who relax binding quantitative credit constraint faced by downstream traders. We show that quantitative credit constraint faced by downstream traders reduces the price elasticity of the demand curve for upstream market agents. More stringent credit constraint lowers the pass-through rate of international prices to domestic wholesale prices.

To discriminate between the models of supply chain with and without quantitative credit rationing, we take advantage of a policy experiment in Bangladesh where the government banned a layer of financial intermediaries in edible oils market called Delivery Order Traders

(DOTs) in 2011. The reform was motivated by widely held belief that these intermediaries exert market power and keep the prices paid by consumers high even when the international prices are falling, by lowering the pass-through rate. The reform is expected to increase the pass-through rate and reduce the marketing margin of traders in a standard double marginalization model without quantitative credit rationing. In sharp contrast, the reform is likely to reduce pass-through rate and increase the marketing margins if the role played by the DOTs before the reform is to provide credit to wholesalers and relax their binding credit constraints.

The empirical analysis based on a difference-in-difference design with wheat as the comparison commodity shows that, contrary to the expectations of the policy makers, the reform raised the consumer prices. It reduced the pass-through rate of falling international prices after the reform, and also increased the intercept of the marketing margin equation. The evidence of a lower pass-through and higher intercept rejects the standard double marginalization model of pass-through in imperfectly competitive marketing chain widely used in the literature, and is consistent with the predictions from the extended model with quantitative credit rationing. The evidence and analysis presented here suggest that credit market frictions and quantitative credit rationing are important for a better understanding of the transmission of international prices to domestic wholesale and retail prices.

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583.

Table 1: Summary Statistics

| | Main Sample | | Full Sample | |
|-----------------------------|-------------|--------------------|-------------|--------------------|
| | Mean | Standard Deviation | Mean | Standard Deviation |
| Palm | | | | |
| Wholesale price | 80.07 | 15.31 | 77.85 | 16.23 |
| Retail price | 84.27 | 16.19 | 82.05 | 16.77 |
| World Price (4-week lagged) | 68.54 | 15.50 | 64.20 | 18.03 |
| World Price (Current) | 69.31 | 15.26 | 64.44 | 17.93 |
| Wheat | | | | |
| Wholesale price | 21.62 | 3.90 | 22.41 | 4.91 |
| Retail price | 24.22 | 3.97 | 25.29 | 5.19 |
| World Price (4-week lagged) | 16.06 | 3.48 | 16.34 | 3.85 |
| World Price (Current) | 16.39 | 3.73 | 16.51 | 3.98 |

Notes: (1) The “Main Sample” Includes 2 years from pre-reform period, “Full Sample” spans 3 year and 2 months before reform period. The announcement period (90 days) is excluded from both. The Main Sample covers May 3, 2009 to October 4, 2012, and the Full Sample covers from January 24, 2008 to October 4, 2012. (2) Unit for Palm is Litre, and for Wheat Kg. (3) All prices are in the local currency, Taka.

Table 2: Wholesale and Retail Trading Margins for Palm Oils and Wheat

| | Palm Margins | | | | Wheat Margins | | | |
|--|---------------------|--------------------|------------|--------|---------------------|--------------------|------------|--------|
| | Before Intervention | After Intervention | Difference | T-stat | Before Intervention | After Intervention | Difference | T-stat |
| 4-week Lagged World Price (taka/kg/litre) | | | | | | | | |
| World-Retail Margin | | | | | | | | |
| Mean | 13.57 | 18.31 | 4.74 | 13.76 | 8.43 | 7.84 | -0.59 | 3.08 |
| Standard Dev. | 4.24 | 4.39 | | | 2.22 | 2.56 | | |
| World-Wholesale Margin | | | | | | | | |
| Mean | 10.42 | 12.86 | 2.44 | 6.41 | 5.86 | 5.21 | -0.65 | 3.51 |
| Standard Dev. | 4.37 | 5.19 | | | 2.34 | 2.27 | | |
| Current World Price (taka/kg/litre) | | | | | | | | |
| World-Retail Margin | | | | | | | | |
| Mean | 11.74 | 18.81 | 7.07 | 16.67 | 8.16 | 7.44 | -0.72 | 3.50 |
| Standard Dev. | 4.72 | 5.92 | | | 2.11 | 3.04 | | |
| World-Wholesale Margin | | | | | | | | |
| Mean | 8.59 | 13.36 | 4.77 | 11.45 | 5.59 | 4.81 | -0.78 | 4.10 |
| Standard Dev. | 4.77 | 5.69 | | | 2.02 | 2.75 | | |

NOTE: (1) Estimates from the “Main Sample” which excludes the announcement period (90 days), and covers from May 3, 2009 to October 4, 2012. (2) Unit for Palm is Litre, and for Wheat Kg. (3) All margins are in Taka.

**Table 3: Main Results: Effects of the Reform on Wholesale Palm Oil Prices
(Pass-through of 4-Week Lagged World Price of Crude Palm Oil)**

| | Estimated Effects from | | | |
|---|------------------------|------------------|--------------------------|------------------|
| | Before- After | | Difference in Difference | |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Reform Dummy | 18.92*** | 23.51*** | | |
| | (6.078) | (6.199) | | |
| Reform Dummy*Palm World Price | -0.179** | -0.211*** | | |
| | (0.0727) | (0.0713) | | |
| Palm World Price | 0.805*** | 0.766*** | | |
| | (0.0453) | (0.0484) | | |
| Reform Dummy | | | -3.150*** | -2.670*** |
| | | | (0.680) | (0.941) |
| Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy | | | 24.38*** | 25.36*** |
| | | | (3.318) | (3.277) |
| Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy *World Price of Palm and Wheat | | | -0.217*** | -0.228*** |
| | | | (0.0431) | (0.0427) |
| World Price of Palm and Wheat *Palm Dummy | | | 0.105** | 0.147*** |
| | | | (0.0510) | (0.0533) |
| World Price of Palm and Wheat | | | 0.643*** | 0.586*** |
| | | | (0.0569) | (0.0599) |
| Palm Dummy | | | 14.30*** | 14.39*** |
| | | | (1.084) | (1.092) |
| Exchange Rate | | -0.0306 | | 0.156 |
| | | (0.281) | | (0.190) |
| Diesel Price | | -0.624*** | | -0.366*** |
| | | (0.145) | | (0.0888) |
| Intercept | 21.88*** | 60.77*** | 14.42*** | 22.70 |
| | (4.269) | (20.82) | (1.511) | (14.76) |
| Observations | 631 | 631 | 1262 | 1262 |
| Year and Quarter dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Ramadan Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Notes: (1) The sample consists of 2 years from the pre-reform period, and the announcement phase is excluded. (2) The Comparison for DiD is Wheat. (3) Unit for Palm is Litre and for Wheat Kg. (3) Standard Errors are corrected using Newey-West (1987) procedure for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, assuming AR (1) error process. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4A: Effects of Reform on Wholesale Price of Palm Oil: Robustness to Alternative Lags in Crude Palm Oil Price (Dependent Variable: Wholesale Price)

| | No Lag | | 8-Week Lag | |
|--|---------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------|---------------------------------|
| | Before-After (1) | Difference in Difference (2) | Before-After (3) | Difference in Difference (4) |
| Reform Dummy | 23.95*** | | 13.64* | |
| | (5.527) | | (7.031) | |
| Reform Dummy*Palm World Price | -0.237*** | | -0.168* | |
| | (0.064) | | (0.089) | |
| Palm World Price | 0.742*** | | 0.645*** | |
| | (0.033) | | (0.070) | |
| Reform Dummy | | -4.013*** | | -4.352*** |
| | | (0.698) | | (0.762) |
| Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy | | 29.28*** | | 26.06*** |
| | | (3.779) | | (4.813) |
| Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy*World Price of Palm and Wheat | | -0.245*** | | -0.269*** |
| | | (0.048) | | (0.063) |
| World Price of Palm and Wheat*Palm Dummy | | 0.132** | | 0.285*** |
| | | (0.063) | | (0.062) |
| World Price of Palm and Wheat | | 0.545*** | | 0.446*** |
| | | (0.068) | | (0.067) |
| Palm Dummy | | 15.98*** | | 14.35*** |
| | | (1.186) | | (1.893) |
| Intercept | 25.79*** | 16.41*** | 40.77*** | 20.23*** |
| | (3.186) | (1.758) | (6.069) | (1.705) |
| Observations | 631 | 1,262 | 631 | 1,262 |
| Year and Quarter dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Ramadan Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Notes: (1) The sample consists of 2 years from the pre-reform period, and the announcement phase is excluded. (2) The Comparison for DiD is Wheat. World Price Includes Both Palm and Wheat. (3) Unit for Palm is Litre and for Wheat Kg. (3) Standard Errors are corrected using Newey-West (1987) procedure for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, assuming AR (1) error process. t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 4B: Robustness with Respect to Sample Used for Estimation (Dependent Variable: Wholesale Price)

| | Full Sample (3 Years Pre-Reform Period) | | Including Announcement in Sample | |
|---|--|-----------------------------|-------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| | Before- After | Difference in Difference | Before- After | Difference in Difference |
| | (1) | (2) | (3) | (4) |
| Reform Dummy | 19.68*** | | 22.76*** | |
| | (5.397) | | (5.919) | |
| Reform Dummy*Palm World Price | -0.184*** | | -0.221*** | |
| | (0.0650) | | (0.0709) | |
| Palm World Price | 0.682*** | | 0.817*** | |
| | (0.0387) | | (0.0437) | |
| Reform Dummy | | -1.083 | | -3.128*** |
| | | (0.741) | | (0.534) |
| Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy | | 25.18*** | | 26.15*** |
| | | (3.478) | | (3.278) |
| Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy *World Price of Palm and Wheat | | -0.240*** | | -0.233*** |
| | | (0.0459) | | (0.0425) |
| World Price of Palm and Wheat*Palm Dummy | | 0.0513 | | 0.104** |
| | | (0.0490) | | (0.0441) |
| World Price of Palm and Wheat | | 0.658*** | | 0.647*** |
| | | (0.0590) | | (0.0475) |
| Palm Dummy | | 18.79*** | | 14.22*** |
| | | (1.316) | | (1.080) |
| Intercept | 37.67*** | 16.31*** | 20.42*** | 14.02*** |
| | (2.691) | (1.318) | (3.958) | (1.174) |
| Observations | 890 | 1,780 | 687 | 1374 |
| Year and Quarter dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Ramadan Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Notes: (1) The comparison for DiD is Wheat. (2) The "Full Sample" Excludes the Announcement Period. (3) The Announcement Sample Includes 2 years from pre-reform period, and post-reform includes the period between announcement and Implementation. (4) Standard errors are corrected using Newey-West (1987) procedure for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation correction and assuming AR (1) error process. Standard errors are in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 5: Effects of the Reform on Wholesale Palm Oil Prices: Short-run vs. Long-run

| | Estimates of Effects from | | | |
|---|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|--------------------------------------|------------------------------------|
| | Before- After (1) | Difference in Difference (2) | Before- After (3) | Difference in Difference (4) |
| | Effects in the First 9 months | | Effects in the First 6 months | |
| Reform Dummy | 28.24*** (7.464) | | 31.77*** (9.783) | |
| Reform Dummy*Palm World Price | -0.338*** (0.0898) | | -0.348*** (0.120) | |
| Reform Dummy | | -5.318*** (0.614) | | -4.428*** (0.591) |
| Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy | | 33.48*** (4.356) | | 19.47*** (6.534) |
| Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy *World Price of Palm and Wheat | | -0.328*** (0.0576) | | -0.129 (0.0884) |
| | Effects After First 9 months | | Effects After First 6 months | |
| Reform Dummy | -8.065 (8.003) | | 9.927 (6.649) | |
| Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy *Palm World Price | 0.0450 (0.0896) | | -0.126 (0.0789) | |
| Reform Dummy | | -8.374*** (0.993) | | -5.231*** (1.082) |
| Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy | | 7.003 (6.205) | | 11.85** (5.136) |
| Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy *World Price of Palm and Wheat | | -0.0162 (0.0744) | | -0.0820 (0.0623) |
| Palm world price | 0.778*** (0.0460) | | 0.811*** (0.0478) | |
| World Price of Palm and Wheat*Palm Dummy | | 0.133*** (0.0508) | | 0.193*** (0.0505) |
| World Price of Palm and Wheat | | 0.604*** (0.0558) | | 0.540*** (0.0562) |
| Palm Dummy | | 14.43*** (1.076) | | 13.76*** (1.084) |
| Intercept | 29.38*** (4.309) | 18.48*** (1.354) | 26.02*** (4.906) | 18.95*** (1.685) |
| Observations | 631 | 1262 | 631 | 1262 |
| Year and Quarter dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |
| Ramadan Dummies | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes |

Notes: (1) The sample consists of 2 years from the pre-reform period, and the announcement phase is excluded.

(2) The comparison for DiD is Wheat. (3) Unit for Palm is Litre and for Wheat Kg. (4) Standard errors are corrected using Newey-West (1987) procedure for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation correction and assuming AR (1) error process. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 6A: Test of the Validity of Parallel Trend in Pre-reform Period: Placebo Policy Date (Dep. Variable: Wholesale Price)

| | Before- After | Difference in Difference |
|---|-----------------|--------------------------|
| | (1) | (2) |
| Placebo Reform Dummy | 6.619 | |
| | (13.94) | |
| Placebo Reform Dummy * Palm World Price | -0.0163 | |
| | (0.183) | |
| Palm World Price | 0.751*** | |
| | (0.0496) | |
| Placebo Reform Dummy | | 1.968*** |
| | | (0.702) |
| Placebo Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy | | -2.689 |
| | | (8.057) |
| Placebo Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy* World Price of Palm and Wheat | | 0.0939 |
| | | (0.114) |
| Palm Dummy*World Price of Palm and Wheat | | 0.00553 |
| | | (0.0596) |
| World Price of Palm and Wheat | | 0.748*** |
| | | (0.0669) |
| Palm Dummy | | 15.48*** |
| | | (1.123) |
| Intercept | 27.13*** | 11.30*** |
| | (4.262) | (1.312) |
| Observations | 471 | 942 |
| Year and Quarter dummies | Yes | Yes |
| Ramadan Dummies | Yes | Yes |

Notes: (1) The sample consists of 2 years from the pre-reform period, and the announcement phase is excluded. (2) World Price Includes Both Palm and Wheat. (3) Unit for Palm is Litre and for Wheat Kg. (4) Standard errors are corrected using Newey-West (1987) procedure for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation correction and assuming AR (1) error process. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

**Table 6B: The Effects of the Reform on a Placebo Commodity
(Placebo Treatment = Lentil, and Control= Wheat)
(Dep. Variable: Wholesale Price)**

| | Difference in Difference (1) |
|---|------------------------------------|
| Reform Dummy | -1.002 (0.866) |
| Reform Dummy* Placebo Treatment (Lentil) | -11.12 (7.385) |
| Reform Dummy*Lentil World Price | 0.134 (0.127) |
| World price of Lentil and Wheat*Lentil Dummy | -0.450*** (0.170) |
| World Price of Lentil and Wheat | 0.993*** (0.0889) |
| Lentil Dummy | 34.20*** (7.045) |
| Intercept | 7.208*** (2.037) |
| Observations | 1,239 |
| Year and Quarter dummies | Yes |
| Ramadan Dummies | Yes |

Notes: (1) The placebo treatment commodity is Lentil. (2) The sample consists of 2 years from the pre-reform period, and the announcement phase is excluded. (3) Units for Lentil and Wheat are both Kg. (4) Standard errors are corrected using Newey-West (1987) procedure for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation correction and assuming AR (1) error process. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Table 7A: Effects of the Reform on Retail Palm Oil Prices
(Dep. Variable: Retail Price)

| | Before- After (1) | Difference in Difference (2) |
|---|----------------------------|---------------------------------|
| Reform Dummy | 14.01*** (5.377) | |
| Reform Dummy*Palm World Price | -0.119* (0.0641) | |
| Palm World Price | 0.775*** (0.0385) | |
| Reform Dummy | | -4.263*** (0.608) |
| Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy | | 26.13*** (2.724) |
| Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy *World Price of Palm and Wheat | | -0.213*** (0.0360) |
| World Price of Palm and Wheat*Palm Dummy | | 0.145*** (0.0477) |
| World Price of Palm and Wheat | | 0.604*** (0.0524) |
| Palm Dummy | | 14.31*** (1.022) |
| Intercept | 29.15*** (3.595) | 18.94*** (1.340) |
| Observations | 631 | 1,262 |
| Year and Quarter dummies | Yes | Yes |
| Ramadan Dummies | Yes | Yes |

Notes: (1) The sample consists of 2 years from the pre-reform period, and the announcement phase is excluded.

(2) Unit for Palm is Litre and for Wheat Kg. (4) Standard errors are corrected using Newey-West (1987) procedure for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation correction and assuming AR (1) error process. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

**Table 7B: Effects on Retail Margin in the First 9 Months and After
(Dep. Variable: Retail Price)**

| | Before- After (1) | Difference in Difference (2) |
|---|-------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Effects during first 9 months | | |
| Reform Dummy | 32.53*** (6.677) | |
| Reform Dummy*Palm World Price | -0.384*** (0.0816) | |
| Reform Dummy | | -5.558*** (0.619) |
| Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy | | 45.46*** (4.406) |
| Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy *World Price of Palm and Wheat | | -0.463*** (0.0590) |
| Effects after first 9 months | | |
| Reform Dummy | -11.80* (6.581) | |
| Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy *Palm World Price | 0.121* (0.0713) | |
| Reform Dummy | | -8.106*** (1.027) |
| Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy | | 6.379 (4.392) |
| Reform Dummy*Palm Dummy*World Price of Palm and Wheat | | 0.0241 (0.0522) |
| Palm world price | 0.769*** (0.0399) | |
| World Price of Palm and Wheat*Palm Dummy | | 0.152*** (0.0503) |
| World Price of Palm and Wheat | | 0.593*** (0.0550) |
| Palm Dummy | | 14.37*** (1.024) |
| Intercept | 33.66*** (3.830) | 21.67*** (1.358) |
| Observations | 631 | 1,262 |
| Year and Quarter dummies | Yes | Yes |
| Ramadan Dummies | Yes | Yes |

Notes: (1) The sample consists of 2 years from the pre-reform period, and the announcement phase is excluded. (2) World Price Includes Both Palm and Wheat. (3) Unit for Palm is Litre and for Wheat Kg. (4) Standard errors are corrected using Newey-West (1987) procedure for heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation correction and assuming AR (1) error process. Standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Figure 1: World and Wholesale Prices: Palm oil




Figure 2: World -Wholesale Trading Margins: Palm and Wheat




Figure 3: The Effects of the Reform on Trading Margins




Figure 4: Palm Oil Import ('000 mt)

